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Information Security System
Rating and Ranking
Dr. Rayford B. Vaughn Jr., Ambareen Sira, and Dr. David A. Dampier
Mississippi State University

Wednesday, 1 May 2002
Track 5: 9:00 - 9:40
Room 250 A - C

The term assurance has been used for decades in trusted system development to express the
notion of confidence in the strength of a specific system or system of systems. The unsolved
problem that security engineers must struggle with is the adoption of measures or metrics
that can reliably depict the assurance associated with a specific hardware and software architecture. This article reports on a recent attempt to focus needs in this area and suggests various categories of information assurance metrics that may be helpful to an organization that
is deciding which set is useful for a specific application.1

W

e believe that the provision of security in systems is a subset of the systems engineering discipline, and that it has a
heavy software-engineering component. As
software engineers, we understand that the
determination and application of measures
and metrics is not an exact science, nor is it
easily accomplished. We also realize that this
difficulty carries over to the trusted systems
world. How one measures the degree of
protection present is, today, an unsolved
question and is primarily accomplished by
craftsmanship and not science.
This issue of rating and ranking systems
in terms of their assurance characteristics
was at least partially addressed at a workshop on information security system ratings
and ranking in Williamsburg, Va.,2 in spring
2001. We will hereafter refer to this as the
workshop, as we reference it in support of
our belief.

•

“... while we often claim
to have metrics that
prove or indicate
assurance levels, we do
not seem to be able to
prove that correctness,
maintainability, reliability,
and other such
nonfunctional system
requirements are in the
software we build.”

Workshop Findings and
Observations

It appears that while we often claim to have
metrics that prove or indicate assurance levels, we do not seem to be able to prove that
correctness, maintainability, reliability, and
other such nonfunctional system requirements are in the software we build. We also
tend to use empirical evidence based on historical performance data in claiming system
strength. However, knowing that a particular defensive strategy has worked well in the
past for an organization really says very little about its strength for the future.
Examples of software engineering difficulties that we face in predicting a system’s
strength include the following:
• Software is not subject to the laws of
physics. In most cases, we cannot apply
mathematics to code to prove correctness in the same way a bridge builder
can apply formulae to prove structural
strength characteristics.
• People who are, by nature, error prone
30
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build software. In the end, any one of
them can intentionally or unintentionally corrupt the system and greatly diminish assurance.
Compositions of mechanisms used to
construct a security perimeter comply
with no known algebra. We remain
reliant on the expertise of our systems
administrators or security engineers.

•

It is easier to attack a system today (an
assurance issue) than it was years ago.
This trend is likely to continue as attack
tools are further automated, shared,
and explored on a global basis.
The workshop attempted to address
these issues and others. Although many
specific techniques and suggestions were
proffered to the group, it was apparent to
all that some combination of measures was
essential, and that this combination could
not generically be applied across all interest
domains. Similarly, it was clear that the
measures or metrics adopted by an organi-

zation to determine assurance need to be
frequently revisited and re-validated.
Attempts to apply a single rating to a
system have been tried in the past and have
failed [1, 2]. The workshop organizers also
agreed that the problem domain might be
best viewed using a non-disjoint partitioning into technical, organizational, and operational categories.
Definitions agreed upon by the conference organizers in the technical category
were measures/metrics that are used to
describe and/or compare technical objects
(e.g., algorithms, products, or designs).
Organizational measures might be used
with respect to processes and programs.
Operational measures are thought to
describe as is systems, operating practices,
and specific environments.
An interesting characterization of
information security metrics came from
Deb Bodeau of The Mitre Corporation [3]
who pointed out that a proper view of
these metrics might be a cross product
involving what needs to be measured, why
you need to measure it, and for whom you
are measuring. Her characterization of this
view in Figure 1 is enlightening.
Another interesting observation made
by several attendees was that the desired
purpose for such measures and metrics
seemed to vary between the government
and commercial sectors. Government
applications seem much more likely to use
metrics and measures for upward reporting. Answering such questions as “What is
our current assurance posture?” “How are
we doing this month compared with last?”
and “Are we compliant with applicable regulations and directives?” seemed to be a
driver for the metrics needed by government.
The representatives at the workshop
from the commercial world seemed less
interested in these questions and more
inclined to look for answers to the quesMay 2002
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tions “How strong is my security perimeter?” “What is the return on my investment?” “What is my level of risk or exposure?” and “How does product performance compare?” The commercial sector
seemed to have far more interest in technical and operational measures than in
process or organizational measures.
The workshop attendees had hoped to
find a number of objective, quantitative
metrics that could be applied. Although
unanimous agreement was not reached, it
was apparent to most that such metrics
were in short supply, had to be combined
with other measures or metrics in a particular context, and were generally not very
useful on their own. Many more measures
that would be considered subjective and/or
qualitative appeared more useful.
Examples of more useful measures
might include adversary work factor – a
form of penetration testing. An excellent
discussion of this topic is found in
Schuedel and Wood [4]. Although penetration techniques are not truly repeatable and
consistent, the workshop attendees agreed
that their results were meaningful and useful. Risk assessments, in their various
forms, were also found to be useful measures of assurance. Such assessments are
accomplished in a variety of ways, but tend
to focus attention in the proper areas and
give a good indication of how one is postured to withstand attacks on a system.
Information Assurance (IA) metrics are
essential for measuring the goodness of IA,
and we believe that overall useful IA metrics are possible. There is general agreement that no single system metric or any
one perfect set of IA metrics applies across all
systems. Which set will be most useful for
an organization largely depends on its IA
goals; its technical, organizational, and
operational needs; and the resources that it
can make available.
In order to help an organization investigate options for IA metrics, it is useful to
look at the different categories of IA metrics in general. These categories are
described as follows:3
Objective/Subjective
Objective IA metrics (e.g., mean annual
downtime for a system) are more desirable
than subjective IA metrics (e.g., amount of
training a user needs to have to securely
use the system). Since subjectivity is inherent in IA, subjective IA metrics are more
available.
Quantitative/Qualitative
Quantitative IA metrics (e.g., number of
failed login attempts) are more preferable
than qualitative IA metrics (e.g., the
May 2002

WHAT you need
to measure

WHY you need
to measure it

WHO you are
measuring it for

• Technical
• Process
• Organization
• System

• Description
• Comparison
• Prediction

• Technical experts
• Decisionmakers at various
organizational levels
• External authorities,
policymakers

Type of Object

Purpose

Intended Audience

Risk Profile

=

IA Organizational
Posture
Penetrability
Crypto.
Algorithm
Robustness
IA Operational
Readiness

Strength of
Mechanism
Level of
Assurance
IA Test
Metrics

Figure 1: Characterization of Information Security Metrics (Bodeau)
Federal Information Technology Security
Assessment Framework [5] self-assessment levels).
Static/Dynamic
Dynamic IA metrics evolve with time, static
metrics do not. An example of static IA
metrics can be the percentage of staff who
received annual security refresher training
[3]. This metric can degrade in value if the
content of the course does not change over
time. An example of dynamic IA metrics
can be the percentage of staff who received
training on the current version of the software package they use. Most metrics used in
penetration testing are dynamic. Dynamic
IA metrics are more useful than static
because best practices change over time
with technology. There is always need to
adapt metrics in compliance with best practices [6].
Absolute/Relative
Absolute metrics do not depend on any
other measures, and these either do or do
not exist [3]. For example, the number of
systems administrator, networking, and
security-certified security engineers in an
organization is an absolute metric. Relative
metrics are only meaningful in context. For
example, the number of vulnerabilities in a
system cannot assess the system’s IA posture alone. The type and strength of vulnerabilities are also important in this context
for making any decision about the system’s
IA posture. The majority of IA metrics are
relative, and so they would not be good for
use as a single-system metric.
Direct/Indirect
Direct IA metrics can be generated from
observing the property that they measure.
For example, the number of invalid packets
rejected by a firewall over a certain period of
time. Indirect IA metrics are derived by
evaluation (e.g., ISO Standard 15408 The
Common Criteria) and/or assessment (e.g.,
risk assessment). Although preferred, sometimes it is not possible to measure directly.

In these cases, indirect measures are useful.
IA is a triad of cooperation between the
technology that provides assurance, the
processes that leverage that technology, and
the people who apply and make the technology work [7]. IA metrics should be all
encompassing – the product, the process,
and the people, because processes build
products that people use. If we want to be
assured that proper information protection
is in place, we need to know what it is that
we wish to protect, that we have the right
product for protection, that the product was
built correctly, and that the right people are
using it properly.

Summary

The workshop was successful in focusing
attention on the area of metrics or measures for systems that have security or assurance as a requirement. It was not successful
in getting agreement on a set of measures
to be used, or even finding consensus in any
particular approach. Nonetheless, several
themes emerged from this workshop that
may be useful. These are reported below, as
taken from the draft proceedings of the
workshop at the time of this writing.
• There will be no successful single measure or metric that can quantify the
assurance present in a system. Multiple
measures will most certainly be needed, and they will need to be refreshed
frequently.
• Software and systems engineering are
very much related to this problem: The
quality of the software delivered, the
architectures and designs chosen, the
tools used to build systems, the specified requirements, and more are all
related to assurance.
• Penetration testing is, today, a valid
measurement method. It is imperfect
and to some extent non-repeatable, but
nonetheless, it is used in both government and the commercial sectors.
Several other testing measures are valuable: They include level of effort, numbers of vulnerabilities found (or not
www.stsc.hill.af.mil
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found), and number of penetrations.
There are differences between the government and the commercial sectors.
One is policy driven – the other is profit driven. Defense in depth and breadth
is important. Knowing how to measure
this defense is also important and a valid
research area. There was no agreement
on how to accomplish this measurement.
Attempts to quantify and obtain a partial ordering of the security attributes of
systems in the past have not been successful to a large degree (e.g., the
Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation
Criteria and the Common Criteria [1,
2]).
Processes, procedures, tools, and people
all interact to produce assurance in systems. Measures that incorporate all of
these are important. We believe Bodeau
has characterized this very well in
Figure 1 (see page 31).

•

•

•

References

1. Department of Defense Standard.
Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. DOD

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

5200.28-STD, GPO 1986-623-963,
1985.
ISO Standard 15408. The Common
Criteria.
Workshop on Information-SecuritySystem Rating and Ranking, Williamsburg, Va. 21-23 May 2001. Draft
Proceedings (unpublished). <www.
acsac.org/measurement/positionpapers/index.html>.
Schuedel, G., and B. Wood. “Adversary
Work Factor as a Metric for Information Assurance.” Proceedings of the
New Security Paradigm Workshop,
ACM/SIGSAC, Ballycotton, Ireland
18-22 Sept. 2000. <wnspw.org> (ACM
order number 537001).
National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Computer Security Division, Systems and Network Security
Group. Federal Information Technology Security Assessment Framework.
NIST, 2000. <http://csrc.nist.gov/
organizations/guidance/framework
final.pdf>.
Bartol, N. “IA Metrics Development
and Implementation.” In a position
paper submitted to the workshop on

Information-Security-System Rating
and Ranking, Williamsburg, Va. 21-23
May 2001. Booz-Allen & Hamilton,
2001.
7. McCallam, D. “The Case Against
Numerical Measures of Information
Assurance.” In a position paper submitted to the Workshop on InformationSecurity-System Rating and Ranking,
Williamsburg, Va. 21-23 May 2001.
Logicon, 2001.

Notes

1. This work is partially sponsored by the
National Science Foundation Grants
CCR-0085749 and CCR-9988524.
2. Sponsored by the MITRE Corporation
and the Applied Computer Security
Associates.
3. The categories outlined here are from
research
at
Mississippi
State
University’s Center for Computer
Security Research, <www.cs.msstate.
edu/~security>, in a larger effort to
create a taxonomy for information
assurance metrics and measures. This
work can be shared by contacting the
authors of this article.

About the Authors
Rayford B. Vaughn Jr.,
Ph.D., is professor of
computer science at
Mississippi State University. A retired Army
Colonel, he served 26
years, including commanding the
Army’s largest software development
organization and creating the Pentagon
Single Agency Manager organization to
centrally manage all Pentagon information technology support. After retiring
from the Army, he was vice president
of Integration Services, Electronic
Data Systems Government Systems.
Dr. Vaughn has more than 40 publications and actively contributes to software engineering and information
security conferences and journals. He
holds a doctorate degree in computer
science from Kansas State University.
Department of Computer Science
P.O. Box 9637
Mississippi State University
Mississippi State, MS 39762
Phone: (662) 325-2756
Fax: (662) 325-8997
E-mail: vaughn@cs.msstate.edu

32

CROSSTALK The Journal of Defense Software Engineering

Ambareen Siraj is a
graduate student in the
Computer Science Department at Mississippi
State University and a
member of the Computer Security Research Center. She is
working toward a doctorate degree under
the direction of Dr. Rayford B. Vaughn
Jr. Her research combines the use of artificial intelligence techniques in the creation of a network-based decision engine
designed to fuse and analyze information
from multiple intrusion detection sensors. She also has a strong interest in the
area of measuring the trustworthiness of
systems and in the use of metrics and
measures to do so. She has written several papers on her work and continues to be
active in that endeavor.
Department of Computer Science
P.O. Box 9637
Mississippi State University
Mississippi State, MS 39762
Phone: (662) 325-2756
Fax: (662) 325-8997
E-mail: ambareen@cs.msstate.edu

David A. Dampier,
Ph.D., served over 20
years in the U.S. Army,
the last 12 as a software
engineer and automation officer. In that
capacity, Dr. Dampier conducted
research in software prototyping and
software evolution at the Army
Research Laboratory, and he taught
software and information engineering
at the National Defense University. In
February 2000, he left the Army to join
the computer science department at
Mississippi State University where he
teaches software engineering and computer science. Dr. Dampier’s research
interests are in formal methods for
software engineering and software evolution, software process automation,
and computer forensics.
Department of Computer Science
P.O. Box 9637
Mississippi State University
Mississippi State, MS 39762
Phone: (662) 325-8923
Fax: (662) 325-8997
E-mail: dampier@cs.msstate.edu
May 2002

